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A QUESTION OF ESTIMATES
How Faulty Intelligence Drove Scouting at the Battle of Midway
Anthony Tully and Lu Yu

S

ince 2005, when Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway was
published, there has been much discussion about its conclusions. Likewise, in
the course of time there have appeared books like John Lundstrom’s Black Shoe
Carrier Admiral, Dallas Isom’s Midway Inquest, Elliot Carlson’s Rochefort’s War,
and Craig Symonds’s The Battle of Midway, and several articles of note. One of
the most interesting interpretations of the battle is Midway Inquest, which came
out in 2006. While we cannot accept all of Isom’s
Anthony “Tony” Tully, managing editor of Combined arguments, he does make a key point—that AdmiFleet.com, is a naval historian/researcher and with ral Nagumo Chūichi and his 1st Air Fleet staff have
Jon Parshall the coauthor of the best-selling Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of been scapegoated, given too much of the blame for
Midway. He is also the author of Battle of Surigao
the Midway debacle. This is particularly true when
Strait. With Jon Parshall and David Dickson, he
it comes to the supposedly faulty reconnaissance
identified in 2000 underwater remains of the Japaarrangements utilized during the battle.
nese aircraft carrier Kaga, discovered in 1999. He
has served as historical consultant on the Battle
In Shattered Sword’s account, Jon Parshall and
360 History Channel series and in ongoing divTully distributed blame more equitably between
ing expeditions surveying the Surigao Strait battle
site. A graduate of Texas Tech University, with Admirals Yamamoto Isoroku and Nagumo, with
postgraduate studies, he currently works in the in- Yamaguchi Tamon (commander of Carrier Diviformation technology and support field. He runs
sion, or CarDiv, 2) coming in for a small share of
the Tully’s Port at Combined Fleet forum on naval
matters and can be contacted at tullyf leet@gmail criticism as well. Though the authors of this article
.com.
believe this interpretation still basically holds true,
Lu Yu is a graduate student at the University of Iowa.
we also feel that the picture can now be sharpened
His interests in military history include the Pacific
considerably regarding the degree of culpability
War, especially carrier operations in the early stages,
the European theater, and the Eastern Front.
of Nagumo and his staff. In a few particulars, we
now feel that Shattered Sword’s account is still too
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This revision is driven by additional publications in the Japanese literature
on the battle appearing since 2005.1 These have been supplemented by insights
derived from a closer study of the reconnaissance arrangements of the Japanese
carrier fleet (Kidō Butai) during 1941–42. These both support Isom’s point that
Nagumo’s decisions were understandable—at least to a degree—and have been
criticized too harshly.
In the article that follows, the interpretation is offered that Nagumo and the
1st Air Fleet staff on the whole made no egregious mistakes with respect to the
scouting arrangements at Midway. More precisely, the conduct of Kidō Butai was
not out of line with 1942 operations prior to Midway or even those during the
Guadalcanal campaign, when the Japanese were operating with the advantages
of hindsight from Midway. Nor was it worse than typical American scouting
arrangements during the same time frame. During all of these battles, Japanese
scouting operations were universally governed by the prevailing situation estimates in the hands of the carrier commanders. Accordingly, the key to understanding Midway becomes discovering with greater clarity what the real mind-set
was among the staff on board Akagi on the morning of 4 June, prior to the battle.
This article presents three items for consideration. First is a discussion of the
newer scholarship from Japan and its implications for the study of the battle. The
second is a review of the scouting arrangements used by both the Japanese and
Americans during the early months of the war. Third, we present a clarified picture of the intelligence that Nagumo had in hand prior to the battle. All of these
factors are then used to analyze why Nagumo and his staff made the decisions
they did.
NEW JAPANESE SCHOLARSHIP
While there has been much interesting work on the battle in Japan, our focus here
is on the records of the 1st Air Fleet. One of the most interesting new revelations
here is startling evidence of both deceptions and deletions in the primary source
material regarding the 1st Air Fleet staff ’s expectations prior to battle. This was
not entirely unsuspected. In Shattered Sword, Tully and Parshall noted instances
suggesting selective deletions of Japanese records. Among others, these included
message groups of Destroyer Division 4 (Kidō Butai’s escorting destroyer unit)
that appear to obscure the scuttling of Kaga and Sōryū. The possibility of such
omissions now appears to have received a degree of corroboration.
These suspicions were enlarged with the publication in 2012 of Mori Shirō’s
Middowei Kaisen (Naval Battle of Midway). It contains important interviews,
some posthumously released, of Midway participants. The most intriguing is of
Air Staff Officer Yoshioka Tadakazu, who was in charge of preparing the 1st Air
Fleet’s postbattle report (since translated into English and known as the “Nagumo
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/6
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Report”).2 Yoshioka admitted to Mori that there had been an omission in the
reproduction of the message log that he compiled. In a radio message of 0220, or
0520 local time (2:20 and 5:20 am), a significant first sentence originally stated,
“It is calculated [projected] that enemy Kidō Butai will not sortie [be encountered] today.” This sentence was dropped from Nagumo’s report as actually submitted.3 Indeed, this omission was not even disclosed by Yoshioka to the writers
of the official Japanese war history series, Senshi Sōsho.
Regarding the significance of his deletion, Yoshioka pulled no punches: “The
real reason of defeat is that deleted message.”4 What Yoshioka was referring to
was the crucial role that the mind-set on Akagi’s bridge played in the battle.
He considered the true reason for the defeat at Midway to be what the deleted
sentence reveals—that Nagumo and his staff did not expect, and therefore did
not even prepare for, contact with an enemy carrier force on the morning of 4
June. Everything that followed flows from this faulty estimate of the situation.
Furthermore, this estimate was not necessarily unreasonable or negligent, given
the intelligence that Nagumo had in hand prior to the battle. This intelligence,
though, was faulty, and responsibility for that must be fairly laid at the feet of the
Combined Fleet’s staff.
That Yoshioka’s superiors agreed with his postwar admission is, in effect,
strongly suggested by the deletion of that crucial sentence. Yoshioka frankly
admitted to Mori that to protect the navy’s reputation, some inconvenient truths
had to be concealed in the Nagumo Report.5 The omission of part of the 0520 signal was just one instance. There were other cases of misdirection and fabrication
as well, which then passed into Midway lore. These included the delayed launch
of the cruiser Tone’s floatplane leading to the crucial late sighting report claimed
by Genda Minoru and the “fateful five minutes” claimed by Fuchida Mitsuo and
Kusaka Ryūnosuke.6
The main objective of these falsehoods was apparently to make the defeat
seem due to plain bad luck on the day of battle rather than to the frame of mind
on Akagi’s bridge. If that is the case, it sheds fresh light on the demonstrable distortion of the record by both Fuchida’s and Kusaka’s accounts (Fuchida’s Midway:
The Battle That Doomed Japan having been particularly important in the West).
In Shattered Sword, the writers wondered whether the misleading conventional
rendition of events had been the work of just these men or whether responsibility
was more widespread. It now appears there was an “understanding” among select
staff officers about how the defeat was to be “spun” (to use a modern term). The
mental unreadiness of Kidō Butai for engaging an enemy carrier on the morning
of 4 June was to be downplayed or even suppressed. Instead, misfortunes of timing and “fates of war” were to be emphasized, as well as how narrow the margin
apparently had been between victory and defeat.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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Incredibly, it is entirely possible that Naval General Staff in Tokyo never heard
otherwise, because scarcely was the 1st Air Fleet report submitted, in mid-June,
than the Guadalcanal campaign was upon the Japanese. Postwar, senior officers who had been involved at Midway were free to reinforce this “agreed” account. We stress that it is not entirely clear how much of the above comes from
Yoshioka’s words and how much is Mori’s judgment. But we hope to show that
Yoshioka’s words accord with the evidence. When compared to other Japanese
carrier operations, the nature of the scouting arrangements at Midway strongly
implies that Nagumo and his staff had already ruled out enemy surface contact
that morning.
If this revelation by Yoshioka is true, it means that on the morning of 4 June
Nagumo’s force was already operating under an even more severe handicap than
previously realized. It has been well known since the 1970s that the Japanese
Midway plan had been disclosed to the U.S. Navy’s code breakers. The crucial
element of surprise had been lost to the Japanese. It is not much of an exaggeration to say that from that point forward the probability of the Mi plan’s succeeding was seriously reduced. But in addition to this terrible burden, there was now
added another—that Nagumo and his staff took their own intelligence estimates
at face value. Accordingly, their preparations all but dismissed the possibility of a
carrier battle on that first day.7 This is critical—loss of surprise could conceivably
have been compensated to some degree by a healthy dose of caution and even
pessimism on Akagi’s bridge that morning. Yoshioka’s revelation makes plain that
such concerns were absent.
A reasonable objection at this point might be that however persuasive this
revelation, it remains simply the claim of a single participant, Yoshioka. However,
it is quite possible to demonstrate the truth of Yoshioka’s statement by looking at
the actions taken by Nagumo and his staff before the battle and then comparing
them to the precedent established by other operations. To this we now turn.
HOW SITUATION ESTIMATES DROVE SCOUTING ARRANGEMENTS
Among the reasons for defeat at Midway, one of the most routinely cited is the
“inadequate” morning search made by Kidō Butai, wherein seven aircraft were
launched to cover most of the fleet’s eastern flank. The analysis made by the U.S.
Naval War College’s Admiral Richard Bates in 1948 was one of the first to put
across this idea, and in many respects it has stood the test of time. Likewise, it
bears noticing that in attempting to fix blame for the defeat, Fuchida and Admiral
Ugaki Matome, chief of staff of the Combined Fleet at the time, both chose to
criticize retroactively the search methodology used at Midway. However, upon
closer examination, it can be seen that Nagumo’s searches were on par with
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Japanese conventions at that time. Indeed, they were also not worse than contemporary U.S. carrier searches, given similar prebattle intelligence.
For instance, Nagumo’s and the 1st Air Fleet staff ’s scouting decisions at Midway show a striking continuity with those used in the Indian Ocean operations
of April 1942. In each case the factor determining what search type was used on
a given day was whether the situation estimate shaped the factor that an enemy
fleet was expected. If no enemy was expected, searches were correspondingly less
comprehensive.
Kidō Butai had sailed for the Indian Ocean on the basis of an operation order
issued on 19 March. This order advised that “the British fleet apparently has three
battleships, two carriers, four Type A cruisers and eleven Type B cruisers in the
Indian Ocean. Apparently 500 planes are in India (including Ceylon). A considerable part of the above is deployed in Ceylon area.”8 This estimate is rather similar to that of U.S. strength prior to Midway, namely, two carriers plus a possible
third in the Pacific area (exact whereabouts unknown) and several squadrons of
aircraft on Midway.
On the basis of its 19 March estimate, Kidō Butai launched raids against Ceylon on 5 and 9 April. Despite his having been sighted by a British flying boat at
1855 on 4 April (and intercepting that plane’s report), Nagumo’s morning search
of 5 April prior to the Ceylon raid was even thinner than the one used at Midway
two months later.9 His scouts were fewer, and they went out a shorter distance.
This was because the Japanese intelligence estimate strongly counterindicated the
presence of British carriers nearby on that day. However, after the 5 April attack
on Colombo and the subsequent sinking of the British cruisers Dorsetshire and
Cornwall, suspicion built among Nagumo’s staff that British carriers might be
nearby after all. At 1600 on the 5th, two enemy carrier-type planes were sighted.
Given their position 350 nautical miles (nm) south of Colombo, it seemed unlikely they were land-based.10 Given this, Nagumo deployed for 6 April a search
that was far denser than the day before. However, it found nothing, and tensions
eased again. When the time came to strike Trincomalee on 9 April, no enemy
carriers were expected, and Kidō Butai’s morning search was similar in density to
that made on the 5th and to the later one at Midway (see maps 1–4).11
This pattern applies to other battles as well. CarDiv 5’s searches at the battle of
the Coral Sea on 7 May (six fifteen-degree sectors, 250 nm range) closely resemble the search made on 6 April off Ceylon.12 In both cases, Kidō Butai expected
the possibility of at least sighting enemy carriers and shaped its search patterns
accordingly. This pattern can also be seen after Midway. In the battles of both the
Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, Japanese searches were markedly better, but
they were driven by the fact that Nagumo and his staff expected enemy carrier
opposition.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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In cases where carriers were not expected,
searches could be scanty
to downright nonexistent. For instance, Admiral Yamaguchi, despite
his reputation for alertness and aggressiveness,
did not bother launching
a long-range advance
search when CarDiv 2
arrived off Wake Island
to deliver its attack on
21 December 1941. 13 It
is true that the Japanese
had four flying boats
from land bases conSource note: Search tracks in maps 1–3 constructed on the basis of Kidō Butai message orders no. 73, 74,
75, 77, and 80; Desron 1 WD, April 1942; CarDiv 5 Detailed Action Report No. 5; and Hiryu Detailed Action
ducting searches; these,
Report No. 9. Maps © 2014 by Jon Parshall, reprinted by permission.
however, were not suffi
cient to detect U.S. carriers had the carriers been approaching from the north.14
Likewise, during the Aleutians operations coinciding with Midway, CarDiv 4
launched on 3 June searches toward Dutch Harbor that were far less dense than
the ones Nagumo would use the following day. In this case, aircraft from the light
carrier Ryūjō searched
MAP 2
to merely sixty miles
SEARCHES: 6 APRIL 1942
on four fifteen-degree
sectors. 15 The Japanese
rightly downplayed the
chance of an enemy fleet
b e i ng pre s e nt i n t h e
Aleutians, though such
cursory searches appear
more than a little brazen
even so.
Nor were Japanese
searches markedly worse
than those used by the
Americans at this time.
For i nst anc e, du r i ng
the U.S. carrier raids in
MAP 1
SEARCHES: 5 APRIL 1942

-
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Fe br u ar y an d March
against Makin, Kwaja-
lein, Jaluit, Marcus, and
other locations, there
were apparently no morn-
ing searches before the
attack launches. 16 Had
the three Japanese carriers anchored at Truk in
early February (Akagi,
Kaga, and Zuikaku) had
timely intelligence, they
might have surprised
the Americans, with dis
astrous consequences. 17
Even as late as the landings on Guadalcanal in
early August, Allied search vectors were comparatively thin. A flank attack by
Japanese carrier forces might have come down undetected from the north, though
that was made less likely by the coverage of land- and tender-based search assets.18
The bottom line is that in early 1942 U.S. carrier operations too were indifferent
to extensive advance searches. This illustrates that in 1942 the practice of how to
prepare for and fight a carrier battle was still very much a learning process for
both sides.
MAP 4
In s u m , Na g u m o’s
MIDWAY SEARCH TRACKS
searches at Midway may
have turned out to be
inadequate, but they rep
resented the norm for
both sides at this point
in the war. They were
certainly not especially
different from that norm
or lacking in some special way. They cannot be
described as “mistaken,”
unless one chooses to
criticize the bulk of 1942
carrier searches (which
would be, perhaps, fair
MAP 3
SEARCHES: 9 APRIL 1942
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enough). The flaws of Nagumo’s and Genda’s search plan at Midway were systemic and characteristic of everyone’s “learning curve” at the time. Thus, Nagumo’s
search plan at Midway was not a cause of Kidō Butai’s unreadiness for a carrier
battle but rather a symptom of it. Indeed, there is a final irony here, that the 4
June search was actually better than almost all the other searches made by either
the Japanese or the Americans when no enemy fleet opposition was expected.
Had Nagumo actually expected an enemy carrier force that morning, he almost
certainly would have sent out a denser search, in accordance with operational
precedent. The question then becomes, why did Nagumo believe that no enemy
carriers would be nearby that morning?
NAGUMO’S SITUATION ESTIMATE
Though some ambiguity persists, the failures of intelligence on the Japanese side
appear to center more on Yamato and the Combined Fleet staff ’s choices than on
those of the 1st Air Fleet staff on Akagi. Some crucial reports were not retransmitted to Nagumo, and no attempts were made to confirm that he was aware of them.
Submarine Sightings. After departure from Saipan, Tanaka Raizō, commander of
the Transport Group of Midway Invasion Force, received various reports on enemy submarine activities. On 30 May he received a report that an enemy submarine had been detected three hundred nautical miles north-northeast of Midway
at 1130 by radio interception.19 The reported position was close to his planned
route to Midway.20 To avoid this potential threat, Tanaka made a course change
to the north on 1 June.21 Also on the 30th, a transport in Tanaka’s force sent a
message, “At 1130 this ship’s communication unit intercepted enemy submarine’s
urgent message to Midway with call sign NERK. Frequency 12,795 kc. The feeling
[signal strength] is very strong so it is judged that the submarine is close.”22 Two
planes were launched to search but found nothing.23 There were several more
submarine sightings by planes or ships of the Transport Group, plus radio interceptions by various communication units.24 Ironically, according to American sources it appears that there was no U.S. submarine operating near Tanaka’s
Transport Group at that time.25
Combined Fleet headquarters, on board the battleship Yamato, received at
least some of these reports; Admiral Ugaki noted as much in his diary on 30
May.26 When the reported position was plotted, though, it was found to be still far
ahead of the Transport Group. Therefore, for the sake of radio silence, the news
was not relayed to Nagumo.27 Actually Ugaki (and probably other members of
Combined Fleet staff) showed little concern that the U.S. forces might be alerted;
as he later wrote, “If the dispatched message was a report of discovering our force,
it would surely serve to alert the enemy, thus contributing to making our game
in battle heavier.”28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/6
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It is not clear how many, if any, of these reports reached Nagumo.29 What is
clear is that he didn’t think Tanaka’s Transport Group might have been sighted
by a submarine. As Yoshioka later recalled, “After the Transport Group departed
from Saipan, we did not receive any report that they seemed to have been sighted
by enemy submarines. Therefore, although after that we were informed of an
increase in enemy’s urgent messages and received radio message that enemy
movement became active, we were unable to determine what these meant.”30
This point is crucial. If Tanaka had been definitely sighted this early, Nimitz
could have deduced that Midway was the target and would have had time to
deploy his carriers. Not being supplied with reports on U.S. submarines (even
though many were mistaken in hindsight) cost Nagumo a valuable source of
intelligence.
Carrier Signal Detected. When Nagumo’s force departed the Inland Sea on 27
May, the Combined Fleet had a sighting report dated 15 May of Admiral William
Halsey’s two carriers (which had been cleverly ordered by Nimitz to make sure
they were detected) operating in the South Pacific. Accordingly, it was estimated
that U.S. carriers would not show up in the initial stage of the Mi Operation.31
However, this assessment grew murkier as battle approached. On the night before the battle (4 June, Japan time), Yamato’s radio interception unit picked up
a U.S. carrier call sign near Midway. It was thought that Akagi, being closer to
Midway, should also have intercepted it. Combined Fleet had previously ordered
Nagumo to reserve half his planes for ship attack, to deal with such contingencies.32 In the end, Combined Fleet didn’t pass this crucial interception on to
Nagumo.33 One of Combined Fleet’s staff officers later regretted it: “This is one of
my big failures.”34 As it turned out, Akagi did not intercept the signal, thus depriving
Nagumo of another chance of being forewarned. Similarly, there is a postwar
claim that the carrier Hiryū intercepted the call sign of a U.S. carrier on the same
night, but that too was not reported to senior officers.35
Transport Group Sighted and Attacked. One day before the planned air attack on
Midway (3 June local), Tanaka’s Transport Group was sighted and then attacked
by planes from Midway. Combined Fleet headquarters certainly knew this. But
the exposure of Tanaka’s force was no surprise, for this had been expected when
the Transport Group entered Midway’s patrol range.36
As Kusaka later wrote in his book, Nagumo knew that at least Tanaka had
been sighted at this time.37 However, it was judged that Kidō Butai itself had not
been sighted yet and that thus the morning attack on Midway could still achieve
tactical surprise. Yoshioka’s words best summarize the 1st Air Fleet Headquarters
situation estimate right before the battle: “It was thought that the vague [i.e., still
in the dark] enemy had not yet detected our intentions.”38
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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Operation K. A plan to send long-range reconnaissance planes from the Marshalls over Pearl Harbor, known as Operation K, had to be canceled owing to the
presence of American warships at the designated refueling point at French Frigate Shoals. It is generally accepted that this news was never passed on to Nagumo
and that as a result the 1st Air Fleet staff, with no knowledge of the cancelation,
assumed that silence on the matter meant that the reconnaissance operation had
gone forward as planned and that the American carriers were where they had
been assumed to be—still in port at Pearl Harbor. In the conventional view, the
failure to pass along to Nagumo the news of Operation K’s failure was crucial.
Ironically, however, this turns out not to have been the case. According to Senshi
Sōsho, the Japanese were convinced at this time that the absence of American
carriers at Pearl would mean that they were still operating in the South Pacific.
Likewise, if carriers were found at Pearl it would mean that surprise at Midway
had been achieved. So either way, the cancelation of K caused little concern, as
the Japanese were already predisposed to interpret any intelligence they gathered
in the most optimistic light.39 This, in turn, reveals a great deal about the staff
inertia that seems to have been so prevalent during Operation Mi.
Submarine Picket Line. Finally, much has been made of the fact that by the time
the intended line of picket submarines between Hawaii and Midway had been
established the American carriers had already passed it on their way to Midway.
The account in Shattered Sword, following David Bergamini’s Imperial Conspiracy and Zenji Orita and Joseph Harrington’s I-Boat Captain, relates how Prince
Komatsu, commander of the 6th Fleet (submarine force), failed to inform Combined Fleet that his submarine cordon would be late in taking position, thus putting Yamamoto’s and Nagumo’s staffs at a disadvantage.40 However, it has since
been discovered that Combined Fleet in fact knew as early as 19 May that the
submarines would be late in taking up their stations.41 Nagumo almost certainly
knew this too, as it was announced before his ships left port. It transpires that
there was no real expectation that the submarines would provide sighting reports
prior to the first air raid on Midway. The Japanese believed that no U.S. carriers
would sail from Pearl until Midway was actually attacked, by which time the submarines would be in position to detect them.42
POOR INTELLIGENCE DROVE POOR ESTIMATES
The Japanese lost Midway mainly because of a disparity in intelligence. The fact
was that prior to the battle the Americans not only had far superior intelligence
but did a much better job of disseminating it to commanders. Conversely, it can
be seen that the Japanese in general, and Nagumo in particular, went into battle
with a very poor picture of what the Americans were up to. Admiral Yamamoto
cannot be blamed for information he did not possess. However, his staff can and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/6
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should be blamed for poor decisions regarding disseminating the information it
actually possessed.
Though arguably too complex, the Mi plan for bringing the U.S. Navy’s surviving carriers to battle was reasonable enough. However, very few plans can survive
forewarning of the enemy. This is doubly true if one remains unaware of the disclosure and makes erroneous and optimistic projections as a result. If Mi suffered
from errors in execution, they center largely on the behavior of Yamamoto and
Combined Fleet. After all, it was Yamamoto who knew that Tanaka’s transports
had encountered submarines on 30 May (making it quite possible surprise was
forfeit). It was Yamamoto who knew that Operation K had been canceled but
allowed the impression on board Akagi that nothing had gone amiss to remain
unchanged. Finally, it was Yamamoto who had detected American carrier call
signs a day before the battle and thus knew that the situation estimate regarding
enemy carriers had become murkier (and more dangerous).
Nagumo’s loss of strategic surprise simply cannot be overstated, as it allowed
the Americans to utilize their reconnaissance assets very efficiently. Under normal circumstances, an island like Midway would be unable to maintain concerted
long-range air searches of its surroundings—such searches consumed too much
fuel and wore out planes and men too quickly. Indeed, sustained long-range patrols from Midway did not commence until 23 May, the day after the atoll had
been positively identified by signals intelligence as the likely site of the Japanese
attack.43 The number of patrol planes needed to cover just 180 degrees out to six
hundred nautical miles would be anywhere between fifty and seventy in all, and
thirty needed to take off simultaneously at dawn.44 Midway never had such numbers. However, because of code breaking Nimitz possessed not only the outline
of Yamamoto’s plan but the approximate approach course of Nagumo’s carriers
and their launch time. This allowed searches of unusual density and scope to be
mounted from Midway as “N-day” neared. On board Akagi, though, the situation
was almost the reverse. There was no expectation of U.S. carriers being present.
It was assumed that any American response would take place after the attack on
Midway began.
It has become fashionable recently to dispute or downplay the role of overconfidence (or “victory disease”) in the defeat at Midway, but its impact remains quite
discernible. Ironically, at Midway the Japanese came into battle with a degree of
confidence that they had not actually felt earlier in the war. Indeed, in contrast
to the sometimes pessimistic results of prewar exercises, the battle experience of
Kidō Butai thus far had suggested that things generally went quite well—actual
war had been easier than the war games.45 Nagumo’s force had never been hit
before Midway, even when surprised by the British bombers off Ceylon. From
what had been heard about Coral Sea prior to Nagumo’s sailing, Zuikaku and
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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Shōkaku, less well trained than the four carriers at Midway, had come through
their first carrier battle fairly easily. Thus, the impression in Kidō Butai was that
confidence was warranted.
There is another kind of overconfidence, though, one that might be termed
“specific suppositional overconfidence” about a particular part of the battle plan.
In this case, the Japanese considered surprise an absolute given. Whatever intelligence came into Combined Fleet’s hands, this suppositional tenet was never
overturned—it was assumed that surprise would be achieved, no matter what.
This had the insidious effect of thwarting any steps that might have been taken
to ascertain whether or not the Japanese plan had been disclosed to the enemy
and to warn Nagumo accordingly. In this context, the 30 May presumed submarine sighting of the Transport Group could actually have been a break for
the Japanese. Had they just assumed from that point that surprise had been lost
and specifically instructed Nagumo to that effect, many things might have gone
differently.
In summation, the mind-set of 0520 on 4 June with respect to Nagumo’s scouting
at Midway hinged on the entrenched 1st Air Fleet estimate that surprise would be
achieved. No enemy carriers were expected to be encountered on the morning of 4
June. Yoshioka’s postwar claims to Mori are confirmed by the nature of Nagumo’s
scouting arrangements, which conformed to normal practice for situations in
which the threat of enemy carriers was considered low. Though the Combined
Fleet staff had information that might have served to revise these estimates, its
members did not feel the need to communicate it to Nagumo. Had it been provided to the 1st Air Fleet—as it had been Kidō Butai practice up to that point
in the war to do when opposition was expected—it seems certain that Nagumo
would have deployed denser searches in response.46 Thus, this entrenched threat
estimate is the true culprit of Kidō Butai’s unreadiness on 4 June. Indeed, as
Yoshioka’s deletion showed, it was held by the Japanese themselves, soon after the
fact, to be the most egregious error of the 1st Air Fleet, one that had to be glossed
over more than any other, to the point of excision from the record of the battle.
Yoshioka’s admission explains many of the inconsistencies and puzzles of
the Japanese side of the battle of Midway (many of them covered in Shattered
Sword). To gloss over and obscure this damning omission, as well as the debacle
of Nagumo’s rearming orders, an alternative narrative to help explain the defeat
was constructed. The puzzles and inconsistencies created by this alternative
narrative—of the kind cover-ups always do create—generated further confusion
and speculations. These range from suspicion that Nagumo ignored Yamamoto’s
reserve-strike-force arming order from the very outset to the proposition that
Nagumo did not receive the sighting report from Tone’s floatplane No. 4 till 0800
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/6
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or later (suggested by Isom).47 None of these have found much support in either
Japanese or English primary sources, modern works, or veterans’ accounts. Once
the purpose of the alternative narrative to obscure the true mind-set that morning of 4 June is understood, though, these speculations become unnecessary.
In retrospect, it can be seen how Nagumo’s situation estimate led to his being
caught badly off guard when Yorktown’s task force was sighted. The estimate
trapped Nagumo in a complicated welter of “damned if you do, damned if you
don’t” decisions that have been well dissected. However, those decisions themselves were products of the bad hand that Nagumo dealt himself at the battle’s
opening when he and his staff failed, however understandably, to account for the
possibility that their battle plan had been disclosed to the enemy.
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